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Abstract 
The debate around industrial policies is increasingly shifting from ‘why’ industrial policies to 
‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ these can be more effectively designed and implemented. 
Paradoxically, although industrial policies are by definition ‘selective policies’, we still lack an 
appropriate set of industrial diagnostic tools which support governments in the design and 
implementation of ‘selective measures’ aimed at the sectoral restructuring and technological 
upgrading of their country. The likelihood of governments achieving a specific set of macro-
policy goals (i.e. structural change) depends on their capacity to understand, monitor and 
influence productive capabilities dynamics underlying structural change as well as on the 
technological upgrading of the overall economic system. Productive capabilities refer to 
personal and collective skills, productive knowledge and experiences embedded in physical 
agents and organizations that firms need to perform different productive tasks; they need to 
furthermore adapt and implement in-house improvements across different technological and 
organizational functions. This paper provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of 
productive capabilities and their role in structural change dynamics. On this basis, the paper 
critically reviews various synthetic indicators adopted by international organizations and 
researchers in cross-country comparisons of productive capabilities, industrial as well as of 
competitive performance. Finally, by identifying the methodological problems and 
informational limits of the various indicators that are currently available and the need to adopt 
multiple informational spaces, the paper introduces a new methodology for mapping the 
different drivers of structural change dynamics and for measuring productive capabilities at the 
national, industry and firm level.  
 1 
Introduction 
Over the last two decades, industrial policy has gradually re-entered both the policy debate in 
developed countries as well as that of development economists and policymakers in developing 
countries. The latter has been described by Dani Rodrik as a process of ‘normalizing industrial 
policies’ (Rodrik, 2008). If industrial policies are back on the government agendas of developed 
economies, especially as a result of their difficulties in finding new roads to sustained growth, 
developing economies, on the other side, are increasingly looking at the possibility of 
implementing industrial policies as a way of driving their structural change and catching up. 
Since the onset of the financial crisis, the increasing interest in industrial policies also derives 
from the resurfacing classical idea that the manufacturing sector has a prior role in driving 
productivity increases, while an ‘over-servitization’ (in particular, ‘financialization’) of an 
economic system might actually undermine its sustainability and prospects of technological 
upgrading (Pisano and Shy, 2009; for a review, see Andreoni and Lopez-Gomez, 2011).  
 
If the debate throughout the 1990s focused on theoretical cases and historical evidence in favour 
of/opposition to industrial policies, academics as well as international actors such as the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organizations (UNIDO) are now focusing on the specific 
problems associated with the design, implementation and evaluation of context-specific policies 
for manufacturing development. In other words, the debate around industrial policies is 
increasingly moving from ‘why’ industrial policies to ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ to design and 
implement them more effectively. Paradoxically, although industrial policies are by definition 
‘selective policies’ (Chang, 1994), we still lack an appropriate set of industrial diagnostic tools 
which support governments in the design and implementation of ‘selective measures’ aimed at 
the sectoral restructuring and technological upgrading of their country. The likelihood of 
governments achieving a specific set of macro-policy goals (i.e. structural change) depends on 
their capacity to understand, monitor and influence productive capabilities dynamics underlying 
structural change as well as on the technological upgrading of the overall economic system.  
 
In fact, the transformation of the productive and technological structures of a given country, 
namely its structural change, is triggered and driven by industry-specific learning dynamics 
through which productive and technological capabilities are generated and accumulated. 
Productive capabilities refer to personal and collective skills, productive knowledge and 
experiences embedded in physical agents and organizations that firms need to perform different 
productive tasks; they need to furthermore adapt and implement in-house improvements across 
different technological and organizational functions.  
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Given the causational dynamics linking the development of productive capabilities with an 
economic system’s process of structural change, the design and implementation of industrial 
policies should result from a fruitful combination of structural change analysis and the adoption 
of productive capabilities indicators at the country, industry and firm level. Being equipped with 
a set of tools suitable for different units and levels of analysis would allow governments to 
develop policies whose selectivity would result not only from the fact that specific sets of 
industries (and their firms as components) are selected, but also from the fact that different 
levels of policy intervention are taken into consideration. In other words, an enriched taxonomy 
of the relevant drivers of structural change operating at different levels of aggregation would 
lead to an innovative taxonomy of industrial policies for structural change. 
 
The approach to and construction of productive capabilities indicators results from the analytical 
distinction of different classes of capabilities and from understanding the role that these entities 
play in production and structural change dynamics. The usual approach to production based on 
functional models does not contribute to opening up the black box of productive capabilities 
and, thus, to explaining and measuring their role as main drivers of production dynamics and 
structural change1. The significant costs and difficulties in collecting micro-level and sector-
specific data on firms’ productive, organizational and innovation activities have also 
discouraged the development of appropriate measurements. As a result, although research in 
economics, development, management and organizational studies has increasingly emphasized 
the central role productive capabilities play, both from a static and from a dynamic perspective, 
we still lack a comprehensive analytical framework, rigorous measurement tools and 
diagnostics.  
 
The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of productive 
capabilities and their role in structural change dynamics. Based on this, the paper critically 
reviews various synthetic indicators adopted by international organizations and researchers in 
cross-country comparisons of productive capabilities, industrial and competitive performances. 
Finally, by recognizing the methodological problems and informational limits of the various 
indicators available and the need to adopt multiple informational spaces, the paper introduces a 
new methodology for mapping the different drivers of structural change dynamics and for 
measuring productive capabilities at the national, industry and firm level.  
 
                                                 
1
 This point was raised in the classical work by Penrose (1959) and Richardson (1960 and 1972). See 
Georgescu-Roegen (1970), Landesmann and Scazzieri (1996) and Andreoni (2010) for a critical analysis 
of the limits of standard models of production. 
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The methodology proposed in this paper mainly relies on theoretically grounded quantitative 
indicators. However, given the complexity and intangibility of many of the aspects surrounding 
capabilities – e.g. the learning processes through which they develop; the level of analysis at 
which they can be observed; the sector specificity of ‘task performance’ profiles – our 
methodology suggests combining and integrating quantitative indicators with qualitative 
information derived from firm-level case studies and historical long-term analyses. The 
identification of causal structures and specific causational chains resides in the possibility of 
integrating multiple approaches through which different forms of ‘evidence’ can be collected2.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. The first section discusses the importance of linking 
structural change analysis with the study of productive capabilities dynamics. By combining 
different strands of research on capabilities, it also provides an operational definition of 
productive capabilities and a taxonomy for the development of productive capabilities 
indicators. The second section identifies the two main approaches that have been adopted at the 
national level to measure productive capabilities, industrial and competitive performances. By 
reviewing the different methodologies, theoretical premises and selected data, the third section 
assesses their validity and limits in a comparative perspective. The third section also outlines a 
new methodology for the study of productive capabilities at the national level and suggests two 
main strategies for measuring and benchmarking productive capabilities at a more disaggregated 
level of analysis.  
 
1.  Structural change and productive capabilities dynamics 
Different historical times and contexts have witnessed the emergence of different ways of 
understanding development and, hence, the dominance of different theories, use of different 
empirical tools and implementation of different policies. Following a long period during which 
the production side of development was disregarded (Chang, 2010), the current debate in 
development economics is gradually rediscovering some of the issues that were central to 
‘classical development economists’ like Prebisch, Hirschman, Myrdal and Kaldor as well as 
‘structuralists’ such as Pasinetti, Syrquin, Leontief and Chenery. Recently, some attempts have 
been made to combine these structuralist theories of economic development with Schumpeterian 
evolutionary microeconomics (Nelson and Winter, 1981) and the capability theory of the firm 
(Penrose, 1959; Richardson, 1960). The integration and cross-fertilization among these 
traditions in economic analysis appears extremely promising given their respective focus on 
                                                 
2
 The use of empirical evidence in the identification of causal structures is discussed in Cartwright (1984). 
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demand-led structural change, supply-side technological efforts as well as institutional 
persistence and change (e.g. Cimoli and Porcile, 2009; Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 2009; 
McMillan and Rodrik, 2011)3.  
 
An analysis of these emerging contributions reveals that they all embrace the notion of 
development as ‘a process that links micro learning dynamics, economy-wide accumulation of 
technological capabilities and industrial development’ (Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 2009:543). 
On the one hand, this definition entails the existence of a causational chain linking the 
productive capabilities dynamics at the micro- (firm and clusters of firms) and meso- (sub-
sectors and sectors) levels with the structural change dynamics of the overall economic system 
(macro-level). On the other hand, this definition also leads to the analysis of another chain of 
causation which moves from the macro- to the meso/micro-levels – i.e. sectors (and 
firms/cluster of firms as their components). The latter ‘top-bottom’ causational chain refers to 
the possibility of influencing and even directing the process of productive capabilities building 
and accumulation at the micro-meso levels through the implementation of selective industrial 
policies. As defined by Chang (1994:60), industrial policies are policies ‘aimed at particular 
industries (and firms as their components) to achieve the outcomes that are perceived by the 
state to be efficient for the economy as a whole’4.  
 
In order to understand how productive capabilities dynamics affect structural change dynamics 
and the design of selective industrial policies, the individual causational chains linking micro, 
meso and macro dynamics must be disentangled. In fact, it is becoming increasingly evident 
that new industrial diagnostics have to be developed and theories translated into both practice 
and specific recommendations if we seek to answer not only the question of ‘why’ industrial 
policies, but also the ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ related to the specific problems governments 
face in the implementation of effective industrial policies (Rodrik, 2004 and 2008; Chang and 
Lin, 2009; Chang, 2010; Lin, 2010; Lin and Monga, 2011; Haraguchi and Rezonja, 2011; 
Altenburg, 2011). 
 
                                                 
3
 It is far beyond the scope of this paper to review and discuss the main potentials and problems that such 
integration would imply from a theoretical and empirical perspective. 
4
 Historically and across countries, selective industrial policies have been the main drivers of productive 
and technological capabilities building (Chang, 2002, 2009). 
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1.1 Structural change and manufacturing development 
Structural change most commonly identifies the process of change of the sectoral composition 
of an economic system and thus the underlying transformation of its productive and 
technological structures as well as demand composition (Pasinetti, 1981; Chenery et al., 1986; 
Baranzini and Scazzieri, 1990; Andreoni and Scazzieri, 2011)5. Structural change dynamics 
entail both a process of sectoral transition – i.e. moving across sectors, from low to medium and 
high productivity sectors – and of sectoral deepening – i.e. moving within sectors, from low to 
high value added sub-sectors.  
 
For a long time, the term industrialization, understood as the transition from the agricultural 
sector to the industrial sector (in particular, to manufacturing industries), was synonymous with 
development. Participation in the global industrialization race was considered a conditio sine 
qua non for achieving accelerated economic growth, increasing labour productivity and 
economic welfare. Historical evidence supported this pro manufacturing vision6. This notion 
that development mainly occurs within a process of structural change spearheaded by the 
expansion of the industrial sector found its first theoretical systematization in Albert 
Hirschman’s and Nicholas Kaldor’s seminal contributions.  
 
In Hirschman’s (1958) unbalanced growth model each sector is linked with the rest of the 
economic system by its direct and indirect intermediate purchase of productive inputs and sales 
of productive outputs – i.e. backward and forward linkages. Based on its system of linkages, 
each sector (as well as sub-sectors and firms as their components) exercises push and pull 
forces7 on the rest of the economy. Unlike agriculture, the industrial sector (specifically, a set of 
manufacturing industries) is characterized by both strong backward and forward linkages and it 
consequently emerges as the main driver of development8.  
 
 
                                                 
5
 In this paper, the term sector is used to describe economic activities at the level of agriculture, industry 
and services. Manufacturing belongs to the industrial (secondary) sector. The latter is composed of many 
sub-sectors including a number of manufacturing industries. The use of this terminology is consistent 
with UNIDO’s terminology (e.g. Haraguchi and Rezonya, 2011). 
6
 As recently confirmed in Szirmai (2011), there is an empirical correlation between the dynamic growth 
of manufacturing output (and manufactured exports) and per capita income in the long run. See Szirmai 
and Verspagen (2010) for a review and test of the empirical evidence collected using growth accounting 
techniques and econometric analysis. 
7
 See Park and Chan (1989) for an input-output analysis of intersectoral interdependencies and an 
empirical assessment of Hirschman’s theoretical framework.  
8
 The classical debate on agriculture vs manufacturing development is discussed in Andreoni (2011). 
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Table  1 Long-term patterns of structural change 
 
Source: Szirmai (2011). 
 
Building on the classical work on increasing returns by Allyn Young (1928), Kaldor (1966) 
developed the concept of dynamic economies of scale which captures the idea that the faster the 
growth of output in manufacturing industries, the faster the growth of manufacturing 
productivity9. In Kaldor’s view, the rate of the overall economy’s productivity growth depends 
on the expansion of the manufacturing sector as well as on the shrinkage of agriculture and 
other non-manufacturing industries such as services, which are characterized by decreasing 
                                                 
9
 The different sources of increasing returns identified in the classical line of Smith, Babbage, Young and 
Kaldor are discussed in Andreoni and Scazzieri (2011). See Toner (1999) for a review of Kaldor’s laws 
and their contribution to Cumulative Causation Theory.  
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returns and contained productivity growth, respectively. Thus, specialization in manufacturing 
industries would imply a double productivity gain.  
  
The pro-manufacturing vision was heavily criticized during the 1980s and was fully abandoned 
the following decade when the pro-services vision became dominant. Theoretical explanations 
for the rising share of services associated with economic growth primarily focused on final 
expenditure patterns and prices – i.e. demand side factors. The basic intuition is that as people’s 
income increases, they begin to demand more services. The drop in demand for manufactured 
goods, so the argument goes, results in the shrinking of the manufacturing sector, which is 
declassed to a second rate activity, especially in countries in advanced stages of development. 
This new vision was supported by the fact that the services sector prima facie assumed the role 
of manufacturing in leading the process of economic growth in both advanced and in some 
developing countries. As a result of an accelerated process of de-industrialization, the most 
advanced economies have, since the 1960s, lost nearly half of their manufacturing sector as a 
percentage of GDP on average (see Figure 1). Moreover, it has been argued that several 
developing countries (India is often taken as a paradigmatic example) are in fact experiencing a 
historically unusual pattern of structural change which is determined by a new technological 
paradigm. According to this explanation, services such as ICTs, business services and finance 
are replacing and (more likely) complementing manufacturing in a pro-growth way.10  
  
Although the pro-services vision continues to prevail worldwide, increased attention in the 
development economics debate has been paid to manufacturing over the last decade, as pressure 
on issues such as the loss of production jobs, loss of national level productive capabilities in 
advanced economies, loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis foreign competitors and trade imbalances 
has been rising. Indeed, an increasing number of analysts has begun raising the question ‘Has 
de-industrialization gone too far?’ and ‘To what extent and in which direct and indirect ways 
does manufacturing contribute to the development of services (and vice versa)’?11 In order to 
answer these questions, an increasing number of economists have recently refocused their 
attention on structural change dynamics and have complemented their research with, firstly, the 
                                                 
10 Less emphasis has been given to the fact that developing countries may be running the risk of 
premature de-industrialization which would undermine their capacity to satisfy future changes in 
consumer demand or to accumulate/build those productive capabilities and institutions that characterize a 
manufacturing-led pattern of growth. See Palma (2005) and Andreoni and Lopez-Gomez (2011) for a 
critical review of this debate. 
11
 See Andreoni and Lopez-Gomez (2011) for an analysis of the manufacturing versus services debate. 
The paper discusses how the bundle of interactions which connects manufacturing and services is 
becoming increasingly denser given the outsourcing of services activities from manufacturing firms to 
services providers in GVCs. 
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microeconomic analysis of firm-level learning processes through which productive capabilities 
develop and, secondly, with the study of a set of various institutional/organizational 
configurations (e.g. clusters, knowledge systems, national systems of innovation) that may 
trigger and/or enable processes of productive capabilities building. As for the latter issue, that is, 
enabling institutional/organizational configurations, an excellent theoretical assessment is 
provided by Bell and Albu (1999), while O’Sullivan (2011) offers a comprehensive review of 
international approaches to manufacturing research. 
 
1.2 The economics of capabilities: A critical review and taxonomy 
The concept of capability ‘floats in the literature like an iceberg in a foggy arctic sea, one 
iceberg among many, not easily recognized as different from several icebergs nearby’ (Dosi et 
al., 2000: 5-6). The main reason why the economics of capabilities lacks a comprehensive 
analytical framework is that capabilities – generally defined as capacities to act in an intentional 
way – have been described by very different actors (and their different actions and functions, 
see section 1.2.2): from individual agents such as entrepreneurs, workers and bureaucrats, to 
collective entities, organizations and institutions, such as firms or clusters of firms. For example, 
Moses Abramovitz (1986) introduced the concept of social capabilities at the country level to 
capture those ‘tenacious societal characteristics’ that influence the responses of given societies 
to economic opportunities. In developing the catching up hypothesis, Abramovitz equates social 
capabilities with managerial and technical competences, but more crucially with a set of 
political, commercial, industrial and financial institutions owned by countries12. This systemic 
concept of capabilities has also been re-proposed in various contributions on regional/national 
technological capabilities or innovation systems (Lall, 1992), as well as in recent literature on 
business environment and industrial commons (Pisano and Shy, 2009)13.  
 
The present paper focuses on the analytical assessment and measurement of productive 
capabilities at different levels of aggregation, namely the ‘national level’, the ‘sector and sub-
sectors level’ (in particular, manufacturing industries) and the ‘firm level’. The following 
sections introduce the so-called ‘capability theory of the firm’ in which the concept of 
                                                 
12
 See also the recent contribution by Pritchett et al. in which a similar concept is adopted in the analysis 
of ‘state capability traps’ (Pritchett et al., 2010). 
13
 Although it is far beyond the scope of this paper, a concept of consumer capabilities can be identified 
by combining Sen’s (1985) seminal work on commodities and capabilities and Pasinetti’s (1981) work on 
consumer learning and the qualitative and quantitative expansion of demand. 
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productive capabilities is rooted and, secondly, propose an operational definition and taxonomy 
for the analysis of productive capabilities. 
 
1.2.1 The capability theory of the firm 
In the Coasian theory of the firm (Coase, 1937), ‘production costs determine the technical 
substitution choices [while] transaction costs determine which stages of the productive process 
are assigned to the institution of the price system and which to the institution of the firm’ 
(Langlois, 1998: 186). Thus, the firm emerges as the more convenient way of realizing the 
production process which is the lowest cost option for obtaining control over the relevant cluster 
of capabilities needed. On the other hand, as theorized by Edith Penrose (1959), creating a firm 
may not simply be a way of reducing transaction costs, but may denote the highest value option 
for the creation and development of capabilities. Penrose’s (1959:149) definition of the firm as 
‘a pool of resources the utilization of which is organized in an administrative framework’ 
constitutes the original foundation of the capability theory of the firm.  
 
The firm is a collection of physical and human resources which can be deployed in a variety of 
ways to provide a variety of productive services. In fact, ‘the services yielded by resources are a 
function of the way in which they are used – exactly the same resource when used for different 
purposes or in different ways and in combination with different types or amounts of other 
resources provides a different service or set of services’ (Penrose 1959: 25). The growth 
process, in the Penrosian framework, is realized through the firm’s recognition and exploitation 
of productive opportunities, specifically of ‘all of the productive possibilities that its 
entrepreneurs see and can take advantage of’ (Penrose, 1959:31). As Best (1999:108) points out, 
‘productive opportunities link the firm to the customer in an interactive relationship in which 
new product concepts are developed. The advances in productive services can extend the firm’s 
productive opportunities by enlarging the members’ capacity to recognize and respond to new 
product concept possibilities in the environment’. 
 
By developing the Penrosian theory of the firm and building on his classical contribution 
Information and Investment (1960), George B. Richardson was the first to introduce the term 
capabilities to economics. Maintaining the analytical distinction between productive resources 
and productive services, Richardson (1972:888) describes industries and their firms as entities 
in which a large number of activities are carried out through the adoption of an appropriate 
cluster of productive capabilities. 
 10 
 
‘It is convenient to think of industry as carrying out an indefinitely large 
number of activities, activities related to the discovery and estimation of 
future wants, to research, development, and design, to the execution and co-
ordination of processes of physical transformation, the marketing of goods, 
and so on. And we have to recognize that these activities have to be carried 
out by organizations with appropriate capabilities, or, in other words, with 
appropriate knowledge, experience, and skills.’ 
 
Richardson’s definition stresses how the concept of capabilities refers to a form of know-how, 
namely ‘appropriate knowledge, experience and skills’ that cannot be reduced to know-that. The 
reason is that productive capabilities imply the capacity to apply the know-that needed to obtain 
a given intended result (Loasby, 1999)14. This know-how evidently emerges and accumulates 
through a continuous process of trial and error, interpretations and falsifications on the basis of 
an experimental and pragmatic approach to the solutions of technological and organizational 
problems in production – i.e. learning processes (Arrow, 1962; Rosenberg, 1976, 1982 and 
1994; Andreoni, 2010). The learning processes through which capabilities develop are 
cumulative in the sense that ‘the acquisition of certain kinds of know-how facilitates the 
acquisition of further knowledge of the same kind, and impedes the acquisition of knowledge of 
incompatible kinds’ (Loasby, 1999:58).  
 
The specific way in which capabilities are built and accumulated has two main implications. 
First, firms tend to specialize in the execution of a certain set of interrelated productive tasks 
(i.e. similar activities) that require the availability of a limited set of capabilities. Secondly, 
firms need to not only know how to perform certain productive tasks, but also how to get others 
to perform productive tasks for them. Firms can indirectly acquire capabilities through two 
major means: either by gaining control of other capabilities (e.g. through the institution of the 
firm or through inter-firm cooperation) or by obtaining access to them (e.g. through the 
institution of the market)15. Thus, as shown by Richardson (1972), capabilities dynamics are at 
work at the very basis of the organization of industry. 
 
                                                 
14
 The need to identify the set of feasible operations in production processes given a set of existing 'work 
capacities' or capabilities has also been stressed in Scazzieri (1993); Landesmann and Scazzieri (1996); 
Andreoni (2010).  
15As Marshall (1920) notes, evolution through the division of labour tends to favour both greater 
specialization (increasing capabilities) and closer integration (an increasing number of institutional 
devices to coordinate capabilities and activities). This idea was complemented by the famous aphorism by 
A. Young (1928) according to which ‘the division of labour depends upon the extent of the market, but 
the extent of the market depends upon the division of labour’. This means that ‘an increase in the market 
triggers further specialization which is a process that simultaneously increases the size of the market for 
specialist skills and activities’ (Best 1999:107). Thus, the division of labour is the fundamental premise 
for a process of specialization and to more effectively increase capabilities.  
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1.2.2 Productive capabilities: An operational definition and taxonomy 
The execution of different technological and organizational functions and productive activities 
by a given firm requires a set of relevant capabilities. Specifically, each function entails the 
execution of a certain number of activities (and tasks as their components). These functions and 
activities are, of course, industry-specific as well as process and product-specific. The reason 
why a multitude of concepts of capabilities has been proposed is that each theoretical and 
empirical contribution has formulated a new set of concepts according to (i) the specific 
functions or activities focused on; or (ii) the static versus dynamic role played by the 
capabilities under consideration. For example, for the first criterion, the technological capability 
matrix proposed by Sanjaya Lall (1992:167; see Table 2) systematizes firm-level capabilities 
according to different functional areas (e.g. process and product engineering) and the degree of 
complexity of different activities (from simple routines to innovative activities)16. Based on this, 
three main sets of capabilities have been identified by Lall:  
 
(1) Investment capabilities: those capabilities needed to identify, prepare, obtain technology 
for, design, construct, equip, staff and commission a new facility (or expansion); 
(2) Productive capabilities: the skills involved in both process and product engineering as 
well as the monitoring and control functions included under industrial engineering; 
(3) Linkage capabilities: the skills needed to transmit information, skills and technology to, 
and receive them from, component or raw material suppliers, subcontractors, 
consultants, service firms and technology institutions. 
 
Applying the second criterion, Bell and Pavitt (1993) distinguish capabilities used to produce 
industrial goods at a given level of efficiency and given input combinations (static perspective) 
from those needed to discover, absorb, adapt and change productive and organizational 
techniques (dynamic perspective)17.  
                                                 
16
 The work by Dosi, Nelson and Winter (2000) focuses on the non-reducible and collective nature of 
some of these productive capabilities. Thus, they highlight the fact that productive capabilities are owned 
more by organizations than by their individual members. The concept of organizational capabilities they 
propose seeks to capture the different dynamics responsible for: firstly, the spontaneous emergence of 
routines vis à vis the intentional development of organizational capabilities; and secondly, the process 
through which a certain productive capability becomes routinized and, vice versa, a routine emerges as a 
distinctive organizational capability. 
17
 The same focus on a specific subset of productive capabilities, namely those required to manage 
technological change, can be found in the operation management and business studies literature. The 
concept of capabilities introduced therein is that of dynamic capabilities, that is, ‘firm’s ability to 
integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing 
environments’ (Teece et al., 1997: 516). This set of capabilities is crucial in explaining differences in 
firms' competitive advantages, as it refers to the specific capacity of the firm to balance continuity – i.e. 
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Table 2 Lall’s matrix of technological capabilities 
 
Source: Lall (1992:167). 
 
Building on a critical analysis of the main theoretical and empirical contributions in the 
capabilities field18, the present paper proposes the following operational definition of productive 
capabilities.  
 
Productive capabilities are personal and collective skills, productive knowledge and 
experiences embedded in physical agents and organizations needed for firms to perform 
different productive tasks as well as to adapt and undertake in-house improvements across 
different technological and organizational functions.  
 
From a ‘static efficiency’ point of view, productive capabilities are skills, experiences and 
productive knowledge that agents require to choose, install and maintain capital goods; operate 
technical and organizational functions; and perform and monitor the execution of a set of 
interdependent productive tasks given certain time and scale constraints. In fact, performing a 
set of interdependent productive tasks does not only require capable agents, that is, agents 
endowed with productive knowledge and relevant skills, but the establishment of a certain 
production capacity as well, that is, of a scale-appropriate assortment of equipment, machinery 
and other capital goods. In fact, the consideration of productive capabilities independently of a 
                                                                                                                                               
execution of invariant processes – with change – i.e. transformation of capabilities, given a certain 
exogenous shock. 
18
 The main roots of the literature on which the proposed definition of productive capabilities is based can 
be found in the empirical research conducted in Latin America in the 1970s – i.e. the so called ‘Katz 
Programme’ – and in the research work of Sanjaya Lall in India. See also Stewart and James (1982); Katz 
(1987); Dahlman et al. (1987); Lall, (1987 and 1992); Bell and Pavitt (1993); Romijn (1999); Iammarino 
et al. (2008). 
 13 
firm’s production capacity would undermine the fact that, according to the production capacity 
installed, different combinatorics of ‘productive capabilities – functions/activities/tasks’ are 
actually feasible (Andreoni, 2010)19. Clearly, the expansion of the productive capacity of a 
given firm results from strategic investments in capital goods such as machines, equipment, 
hardware and software. 
 
From a ‘dynamic efficiency’ perspective, the absorption, adaptation and improvement of given 
productive techniques, as well as innovations across different organizational and technological 
functions, mainly depend on the availability of a specific subset of productive capabilities called 
technological capabilities. Capabilities needed to generate, absorb and manage technological 
and organizational change may differ substantially from those needed to perform in existing 
production systems. Although this distinction may be useful as a focusing device, it tends to 
underestimate the fact that technical change, especially in the form of small improvements, 
takes place throughout the entire production process and in all functional areas and thus requires 
the activation of all kinds of productive capabilities. This implies that although some productive 
capabilities – i.e. what we call technological capabilities – represent the main drivers in the 
process of technological and organizational change, they are not the only set of capabilities 
these processes require. In other words, it would be misleading to believe that ‘labs’ and ‘R&D 
departments’ where technological capabilities are presumably concentrated are the unique loci 
of technological and organizational change. In fact, as economic historians (Schumpeter, 1934; 
Rosenberg, 1976, 1982 and 1994; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986) have shown, the accumulation of 
productive capabilities (and, in particular, of technological capabilities) results from deliberate 
in-house efforts as well as cumulative processes of learning by doing, by using and by 
interacting, realizing the first investment and product design phase all the way up to the 
organizational and production phases20. 
 
To visualize the different classes of productive capabilities which allow firms to operate across 
different functional areas and to perform productive and technical change activities, we develop 
a detailed taxonomy (see Table 3). The taxonomy is structured on two main axes. The vertical 
axis identifies different functional areas, while the horizontal axis distinguishes between a list 
of productive activities (static perspective) and a list of specific technical change activities 
(dynamic perspective) for each functional area. As discussed, technical change activities require 
                                                 
19
 Andreoni (2010) develops a ‘capability theory of production’ in which capabilities concepts are 
embedded in a structural analysis of production processes. 
20
 See also Andreoni (2010) on the concept of ‘structural learning’, that is, the process of reconfiguring 
the analytical map of production relationships triggered by complementarities discovery in historical time. 
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a specific subset of productive capabilities, namely those technological capabilities that are 
necessary (albeit not sufficient) to change the way in which productive activities are performed 
in each functional area. The proposed taxonomy also sheds some light on the fact that few 
productive capabilities are function-specific and activity-specific, but more importantly, it 
suggests that even performing the simplest productive activities very often requires the 
activation and matching of interdependent clusters of productive capabilities. In other words, 
taxonomies should not fix specific sets of productive capabilities in one exclusive functional 
area.  
 
Table 3  A taxonomy of productive capabilities 
 
 
Functional areas 
 
1.Investment  2.Product 
design 
3.Process 
organization 
4.Production 
process 
 
5.Linkage and 
cooperation  
Feasibility studies Replication of fixed 
specifications and 
designs 
Production 
planning and 
control 
Work flow 
scheduling and 
monitoring 
Exchange with 
suppliers 
Negotiations and 
bargaining suitable 
terms and 
conditions 
Standard design 
for manufacturing 
International 
certification      
(ISO 9000) 
Manufacture of 
components 
Horizontal 
cooperation across 
firms 
Equipment and 
machinery 
procurement  
Development of 
prototypes 
Automation of 
processes 
Sub-assembly and 
assembly of 
components and 
final goods 
Distribution and 
marketing 
Recruitment of 
skilled personnel 
 Adoption of 
modern 
organizational 
techniques (e.g. 
just in time and 
total quality 
control) 
Stretching, control 
and maintenance 
of machinery and 
equipment 
After sale services 
  Flexible and multi-
skilled production 
Inventory control  
Productive 
activities: 
 
 
  Architectural 
services 
Productivity and 
quality control 
 
Search for 
technology sources 
Adaptations to 
product technology 
driven by market 
needs and 
requests  
Selection of 
technology and 
organizational 
formats 
Efficiency 
improvement in 
tasks execution 
Technological 
transfer and S&T 
linkages 
development 
Equipment design 
and adaptation 
Improvement of 
product standards 
and quality 
Minor changes to 
process technology 
to adapt it to local 
conditions 
Improvement and 
cost savings in 
machinery and 
equipment 
Coordinated R&D 
and joint ventures 
Engineering 
training  
Development of 
complementary 
products (e.g. 
embedded 
software) or 
components  
Improvement and 
development of 
new organizational 
techniques 
Inverse 
engineering and 
development of 
machinery  
Licensing own 
technologies to 
others 
Joint ventures R&D into new 
product generation 
Improvement to 
layout 
  
 
 
Technical 
change 
activities:  
 
 R&D (basic) into 
new materials and 
new specifications 
Process oriented 
R&D (basic) for 
radical innovation 
  
   Source: Author. 
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1.3 Causational chains: A synthesis 
The analysis developed in the previous sections starts from the recognition that a specific causal 
structure exists which links productive capabilities dynamics at the micro-meso levels with the 
structural change of the overall economic system. Productive capabilities dynamics are clearly 
not only responsible for sectoral transition (from agriculture to manufacturing and services), but 
also for sectoral deepening, that is, for technological upgrading and the subsequent increase of 
productivity within each sector (as well as within the subsectors, in particular, in the 
manufacturing industries). The difficulties in identifying the broader causal structure as well as 
disentangling the complex causational chains linking micro-meso and macro-level processes are 
attributable to two main facts. 
 
Firstly, causational chains are not linear. At the micro- (firm) and meso- (sector and sub-sectors) 
levels, productive capabilities interact in a circular and cumulative process of mutual 
reinforcement in which the introduction of new productive techniques leads to new productive 
activities and opportunities of consumption that, in turn, spur new technological innovations and 
eventually trigger processes of sectoral deepening and sectoral transition (see Figure 1).  
 
Secondly, the process of productive capabilities building and accumulation has to be 
complemented by a congruent expansion of the production capacity. For example, if a firm in a 
given economic system undergoes a process of productive capabilities building and 
accumulation, and intends to fully realize it, it will have to make strategic investments for the 
expansion of its production capacity. The reason why the increasing availability of productive 
capabilities has to be matched with an expansion of the production capacity is that if the 
production capacity is not adjusted accordingly, the firm will be constrained by the material 
structures of production (such as a given assortment of machines, equipment, hardware and 
software), the emergence of organizational and technological bottlenecks and the changing 
inter-firm vertical and horizontal relationships. Clearly, the lack of coordination among different 
but interdependent investments in production capacity expansion and productive capabilities 
building may prevent processes of sectoral deepening and/or sectoral transition, especially in the 
context of catching up economies.    
 
To realize each specific dynamic process presented in the boxes in Figure 1, as well as each 
causational chain linking them, specific industrial diagnostics have to be developed. The set of 
methodologies presented in this paper (part III) are first attempts in this direction.  
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Figure 1 Causational chains 
 
 
       Source: Author. 
 
2.  Measuring productive capabilities at the national level: A menu for choice 
The first national science and technology (S&T) indicators were developed in the United States 
in 1973. Early indicators were mainly focused on input-based variables, while they were weaker 
on the output and impact sides (Grupp and Mogee, 2004). In the same period, from the 1970s to 
the 1980s, national reports were produced by UK, Germany, France, Japan, Austria, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Scandinavian countries, and later followed by Eastern European countries. 
Among them, the Japanese NISTEP (National Institute of Science and Technology Policy) 
developed ‘cascade models’ to integrate S&T indicators as well as experimental factor analysis 
(Kodama, 1987). Among international organizations, OECD made an important contribution by 
making statistics and indicators comparable among member states, with the celebrated Frascati 
Manual and, later, with the Oslo and Bogota Manuals (OECD, 1992, 2002 and 2006).  
 
Many of these national level indicators have been developed for different goals, from S&T 
assessment to innovation and competitiveness analysis21. The menu of indicators reviewed here 
is constructed by selecting those indicators which appear to be more suitable for capturing the 
level of productive and technological capabilities of a given country as well as those indicators 
that refer to a broad sample of low, middle and high income countries. Two main approaches 
exist to measure and/or proxy national-level productive capabilities:  
 
                                                 
21
 Other reviews of these indicators are proposed in Archibugi and Coco (2005) and in Archibugi et al. 
(2009a).  
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(1) The first group of indicators (detailed in section 2.1 and subsections) consists of 
country-level indicators which combine information primarily extracted from 
input-based variables, as well as in some cases  from a few output-based 
variables. Apart from a few exceptions, these indicators tend to be 
methodologically homogenous and recur in similar data sources. A comparative 
analysis across indicators (e.g. data sources, countries and time coverage) is 
presented in section 2.2. 
 
(2) The second group of indicators (detailed in section 2.3) comprises what we call 
‘trade-based indicators’. These indicators were recently developed as indirect 
measures of country-level productive capabilities. They infer country-level 
productive capabilities on the basis of the degree of complexity/sophistication 
of the products exported by countries in global trade.  
 
2.1  Country-level productive capabilities indicators, competitiveness 
assessment and cross-country comparisons 
2.1.1  The Global Innovation Scoreboard (EU Commission) 
• Summary Innovation Index (SII)  
(Synthetic index - European Innovation Scoreboard) 
The SII was developed and has been computed since 2000 as part of the European 
Innovation Scoreboard. It is estimated as an arithmetic mean of the 25 normalized 
values obtained from 25 sub-indicators. All 25 indicators have been assigned the same 
weight. These indicators include variables which account for innovation inputs 
(innovation driver, knowledge creation, innovation & entrepreneurship) and innovation 
output (application and intellectual property). Data are collected for 34 countries and 
integrated by the Community Innovation Survey (CIS).  
 
• Global Summary Innovation Index (GSII)  
(Synthetic index - Global Innovation Scoreboard) 
In 2006, the GSII was introduced to compare the 34 countries included in SII with other 
major international competitors (other 14 major R&D performing countries in the 
world). The GSII includes five composite sub-indicators covering the five dimensions 
applied in SII: innovation inputs (innovation driver, knowledge creation, innovation & 
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entrepreneurship) and innovation output (application and intellectual property). See 
section 2.2 for a detailed analysis of variables included and data sources.  
 
• New Global Summary Innovation Index (newGSII) - 2008 
(Synthetic index – New Global Innovation Scoreboard, GIS 2008) 
The new Global Innovation Scoreboard 2008 (GIS, 2008) explores the innovation 
performance of the EU-27 and other major R&D spenders in the world: Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Hong Kong (SAR), India, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, 
Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa and the 
United States. The GIS 2008 methodology includes nine indicators of innovation and 
technological capabilities, grouped in three main dimensions (pillars) and weighted as 
shown in Table 4. For each pillar a composite indicator is obtained as the simple 
average of the sub-indicators. The GIS 2008 has been calculated relative to 1995 and 
2005. 
 
Table 4 The Global Summary Innovation Index, 2008 
 
Source: Archibugi et al. (2009b); European Commission (2010 and 2011). 
 
 
All indicators in the GIS are indicators of intensity: all values are weighted to account for the 
different size of nations. All variables are normalized on a scale from 0 to 1, and countries are 
ranked on an ordinary scale.  
 
2.1.2  Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard (OECD) 
The Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard (STI) has been published every other year 
since 1981. The last STI scorecard published in 2009 (OECD, 2009) includes 35 countries 
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(OECD countries and major non-OECD countries, notably Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa). The scorecard provides detailed country-level measures in the areas of R&D and 
innovation, human resources in science and technology (knowledge and skills), patents and 
other IPRs, ICT infrastructures, knowledge flows embedded in trade and investment and the 
impact of knowledge in productive activities.  
 
2.1.3  Knowledge Assessment Methodology (World Bank) 
The Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM) is the statistical package developed by the 
World Bank for cross-country comparisons on various aspects of the knowledge economy. The 
most recent version (KAM, 2008) provides comparisons for around 140 countries based on 83 
structural and qualitative variables grouped in four main dimensions (pillars). All variables are 
normalized on a scale from 0 (weakest) to 10 (strongest), and all countries are ranked on an 
ordinal scale. The four pillars are presented in Table 5. Measures of individual indicators are 
summarized through radar graphs for cross-country comparisons (see Figure 2 for an example).  
 
Table 5 The KAM basic scorecard         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2009:3). 
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Figure 2 A radar graph comparison, KAM (2007) 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2009:3). 
 
 
 
• Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) 
(Synthetic index – Knowledge Assessment Methodology) 
The most known composite indicator included in the KAM is the Knowledge Economy 
Index (KEI). This index is obtained as the simple average of the normalized values of 
the 12 indicators listed in Table 4. The closer the KEI score is to 10, the higher the 
amount of good ‘knowledge pillars’ in the respective economy. Over time, comparisons 
are possible for two points in time: 1995 and the most recent year covered. 
 
2.1.4  Competitiveness indexes (World Economic Forum) 
The competitiveness indexes promoted by the World Economic Forum have been widely 
publicized by mass media, although in-depth analysis has revealed the existence of flaws and 
inconsistencies (Lall, 2001; Godin, 2004). The WEF defines competitiveness as ‘the set of 
institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country’ (WEF, 
2008:3). The determinants/components of competitiveness are grouped in the ‘12 pillars’ 
scheme (Table 6). 
 
 
 
 21 
Table 6 The ‘12 pillars’ of competitiveness (WEF, 2008)   
 
Source: WEF, 2008. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to review all indexes used and the different methodologies 
adopted for each pillar since the first Global Competitiveness Report was published. This 
section focuses on a selection of indexes developed to capture productive and technological 
capabilities at the country level and on outlining the methodology developed for the New 
Global Competitiveness Index (WEF, 2008).  
 
• GroCI – Growth Competitiveness Index (WEF)  
Sub-indicator: Technology Index (Tech) 
GroCI was introduced in 2001/2002 to capture growth potentials of countries in the 
medium term. It was based on three macroeconomic pillars: quality of the 
macroeconomic setting, robustness of public institutions and technological innovation 
capabilities. The last dimension is captured by the sub-indicator Technology Index 
(Tech) which consists of three technological variables: innovative capabilities, diffusion 
of new ICTs and technology transfer. The latter variable, captured by non-primary 
exports, is only considered for non-core economies, namely those with less than 15 US 
patents per million population. The Tech Index has been calculated for 125 countries 
based on both hard and soft data (Global Competitiveness Report, GCR 2006-2007 
edition). See section 2.2 for a detailed description of variables included and data 
sources. 
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• GloCI – Global Competitiveness Index (WEF)  
Sub-indicator: Technological Readiness Index (TechRead) 
Sub-indicator: Technological Innovation Index (TechInnov) 
The second composite indicator, GloCI, was firstly introduced in the GCR 2004/05 
edition. It is composed of approximately 89 indicators, subdivided in three sub-groups: 
a) basic requirements; b) efficiency enhancers; and c) innovation and sophistication 
factors. Different aggregation methods are adopted for these sub-groups and in 
accordance with the given country’s developmental stage. Countries at the initial stage 
of development assigned the following normalized weight to the sub-groups: 0,5 – 0,4 – 
0,1; countries at the intermediate stage: 0,4 – 0,5 – 0,1; and countries at an advanced 
stage: 0,3 – 0,4 – 0,3. Per capita GDP defines different countries’ stage of development. 
Data are drawn from both secondary sources as well as the WEF Executive Opinion 
Survey. The GloCI index is based on 9 pillars: institutions, infrastructure, 
macroeconomy, health and primary education, higher education and training, market 
efficiency, technological readiness, business sophistication and innovation. The seventh 
and ninth pillars, namely those which strictly refer to technological capabilities, are 
captured by the TechRead and the TechInnov indexes. See section 2.2 for a detailed 
description of the variables included in these two indexes22.  
 
• New Global Competitiveness Index (NGCI) 
The New Global Competitiveness Index was introduced in the WEF Report 2008-9 with 
the explicit aim of replacing the two main indexes discussed above with a single fully 
integrated index. The majority of individual indicators used in the previous indexes 
have been incorporated into the new index. However, the way in which they are 
combined has changed drastically on account of the adoption of a new ‘hierarchical 
model’ for the assessment of competitiveness (see Table 7) and more rigorous statistical 
methodologies (see Table 8). The data used for the development of the NGCI cover 130 
countries for up to 7 years (2001–07).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 See also the WEF (2011) Appendix A: Computation and structure of the Global Competitiveness 
Index. 
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Table 7 The New Global Competitiveness Model  
 
Source: WEF (2008:55). 
 
Table 8 The New Global Competitiveness Methodology 
 
Source: WEF (2008:57). 
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2.1.5  Technology Achievement Index (UNDP) 
The TAI has been developed by Desai et al. (2002:101) and reported in the Human 
Development Report 2001 only. The index focuses on four dimensions of technological 
capacity:  
1. Technology creation: measured by the number of patents granted to residents per capita 
and by receipts of royalties and license fees from abroad per capita. 
2. Diffusion of recent innovations: measured by the number of Internet hosts per capita and 
the share of high-technology and medium-technology exports in total goods exports. 
3. Diffusion of old innovations: measured by telephones (mainline and cellular) per capita 
and electricity consumption per capita. 
4. Human skills: measured by the mean years of schooling in the population aged 15 and 
older, and the gross tertiary science enrolment ratio. 
Thus, each dimension is captured by two sub-indicators which, in turn, are aggregated (simple 
average and standard normalization) in the synthetic indicator TAI for 84 countries. See section 
2.2 for a detailed analysis of variables and data sources.  
 
2.1.6    Innovation Capability Index (UNCTAD) 
The UNCTAD Innovation Capability Index (UNICI) was developed by UNCTAD (World 
Investment Report 2005) and calculated for 117 countries for the years 1995 and 2001. This 
index is based entirely on quantitative variables which are direct measures of technological 
activity and technical human capital. It is composed of two sub-indicators: the Technology 
Activity Index (TAct) and the Human Capital Index (HCI) which, respectively, capture the 
innovative activity and the skills availability for such activity. As detailed in Table 9, UNICI 
sub-indicators and their variables are assigned the same weights (the only exception being the 
HCI).   
 
Table 9 The Innovation Capability Index (UNICI) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2005:113). 
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2.1.7  The Industrial Development Scoreboard (UNIDO) 
UNIDO has a longstanding tradition in the analysis of industrial competitive performances at 
the country level as well as in the assessment of countries’ industrial capabilities, that is, of 
those specific capabilities that drive production in manufacturing industries23. This section 
reviews the two main sets of indicators developed over the last decade as part of UNIDO’s 
Industrial Development Scoreboard (IDS)24: 
• Industrial capability indicators (UNIDO, 2002); 
• Indicators of industrial performance, namely the Competitive Industrial 
Performance Index (UNIDO, 2002; UNIDO, 2007; UNIDO, 2009; UNIDO, 2010)25 
and the Industrial cum Technological Advance Index (UNIDO, 2005). 
 
All indicators included in the IDS focus on manufacturing industries and rely on a small number 
of structural variables only for which hard data are available. The combined use of these 
country-level indicators allows us to conduct cross-country comparisons and, consequently, to 
‘benchmark’ industrial development.  
 
2.1.7.1      Industrial capability indicators: The drivers of industrial performance 
Industrial capability indicators result from the identification and measurement of five drivers of 
industrial performance – i.e. skills, technological effort, inward FDI, royalty and technical 
payments abroad, modern infrastructure – and are based on two fundamental methodological 
premises. The first premise is that ‘mapping the structural influences on industrial performance 
– termed drivers – calls for selectivity and simplification’ (UNIDO, 2002:34); the second one is 
that as countries combine the drivers in different ways, it is convenient to construct sub-
indicators (see Table 10) and to group countries by conducting a cluster analysis (as an example, 
see Figure 3) to conflate all the drivers into one overly composite indicator. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Many of them were first introduced in the Industrial Development Report 2002-3. See also the series of 
Industry and Development Global Reports, in particular, The UNIDO 1989/90 and 1990/91 Industry and 
Development Global Reports discussed in section 3.5.  
24
 See also Lall and Albaladejo, QEH WP 2002 (published as Lall, 2003). 
25
 The Industrial Development Report, 2009: Chapter 11 offers the last updated version of the CIP index. 
The UNIDO Working paper 05/2009 applies CIP’s sub-indicators to trace ‘changing patterns in industrial 
performance’. 
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Table 10 The UNIDO Industrial Capability Indicators 
 
Source: Author. Coloured lines identify the various combined uses of drivers in cluster analysis and composite 
indicators.  
 
Figure 3 Cluster analysis of skills, infrastructures and R&D in developing economies 
  
Source: UNIDO (2002:61). 
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2.1.7.2    The Competitive Industrial Performance index (CIP) 
The Competitive Industrial Performance index benchmarks countries’ ability to produce and 
export manufactures competitively. A combination of four sub-indicators of industrial 
performance is used to capture different dimensions of countries’ competitiveness in 
production. The four sub-indicators26 are obtained from basic indicators about the productive 
and technological structures of countries: 
• Manufacturing value added per capita (MVA) 
• Manufactured exports per capita (MEXP) 
• Technological structure of MVA and MEXP according to the classification: 
- Resource-based manufactures: processed food, refined petroleum, organics 
- Low-tech manufactures: textiles/garments, simple metal/plastics, furniture 
- Medium-tech manufactures (MTM): heavy industry products such as automobiles, 
industrial chemicals, machinery and relatively standard electrical and electronics 
product 
- High-tech manufactures (HTM): complex electrical and electronic (including 
telecommunications) products, aerospace, precision instruments, fine chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals. 
The four sub-indicators are combined as illustrated in the following Table 11. 
 
Table 11 The CIP index formula 
Sub-indicator Ii  with i = 1,…,4 
I1: MVA per capita (captures a country’s level of industrialization) 
I2: MEXP per capita (captures a country’s ability to produce goods competitively) 
I3: Industrial intensity: IInt= (share of MVA in GDP + share of MTM and HTM in MVA) / 2  
I4: Export quality: MXq= (share of MEXP in total EXP + share of MTM and HTM in MEXP) / 2   
(Standardization formula: Ii = (X i – minX i) / (maxX i - minX i) ) 
CIP index = ¼ Σi=4 Ii 
Source: Author. 
 
 
As the analyses based on the CIP index have shown (in particular, see UNIDO, 2002; Lall, 
2003; UNIDO, 2009), this output-based indicator of productive capabilities can be adopted in 
different contexts, from assessing industrial performance over time or explaining export 
performances up to more innovative analyses such as of ‘industrial sustainability’. UNIDO 
                                                 
26
 The four components of the CIP are highly correlated, especially MVA and industrial intensity. 
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(2002), for example, analyses the relationship between industrial performance (CIP index) and 
environmental performance (CO2 emissions). The regression analysis has shown that 
industrialization can raise the propensity to pollute, but that this relationship follows an inverted 
U pattern (see Figure 4)27.         
 
Figure 4 Regression of CIP on CO2  
 
Source: UNIDO (2002:54). 
 
2.1.7.3     Industrial cum Technological Advance Index (ITA)  
Sub-indicator: Technology Advance Index (TechAd) 
Sub-indicator: Industrial Advance Index (IndAd) 
The ITA was presented in UNIDO’s Industrial Development Report 2005 and was calculated 
for 161 countries for 1990 and 2002. It is composed of two sub-indicators, namely the TechAd 
and the IndAd, which, respectively, capture the technology and industrial advance axes of the 
                                                 
27
 Luetkenhorst (2010: 18) highlights that ‘industrial policy today cannot be relevant, cannot be effective, 
and cannot be credible, unless it is explicitly framed in the context of natural resource scarcity’. The 
design of ‘sustainable industrial policies’ calls for the development of new indicators which facilitate the 
identification of different patterns of sustainable industrialization.  
 29 
six performance indicators model. The industrial advance index is defined as the arithmetic 
mean of the share of manufacturing in GDP and the share of manufactures in total exports. In 
analogy, the Technology Advance Index is obtained as the arithmetic mean of the share of 
medium- or high-technology activities in MVA and the corresponding share in exports. The 
values of both indicators, which are obtained as averages of shares, lie between zero and one. 
See Table 12 below for a detailed reference of included variables. 
 
2.2 A comparative analysis of country level indicators  
By comparing the set of indicators presented in section 2.1, Table 12 shows how the statistical 
sources used are often similar, while their coverage (in terms of countries and years of 
observation) may differ significantly. This last issue may represent a serious problem of 
comparability across indicators. 
 
Table 12 A menu for choice 
Typology Variable Data source Coverage 
countries (years) 
Included in 
Public R&D exp ( % GDP) EUROSTAT+CIS 48 (2006) 
 
GSII 
 
Business R&D exp (% GDP) EUROSTAT+CIS 
WEF opinion survey 
 
48 (2006) 
125 (2004-06) 
 
GSII 
TechInnov 
 
R&D expenditure (% GDP) 
 
WEF opinion survey 125 (2004-06) 
 
Tech 
Firms’ capabilities in adopting new technologies 
 
WEF opinion survey 125 (2004-06) 
 
TechRead 
Electricity consumption 
 
UNDP 
ArCo (2004) 
 
72 (1995 – 2000) 
162 (1990 & 2000) 
 
TAI 
ArCo 
ICT expenditures (% GDP) EUROSTAT+CIS 48 (2006) 
 
GSII 
 
Land lines per 100 population 
Land lines per 100 population 
Telephone mainlines 
Land lines per 1000 pop 
 
K4D 
WEF hard data 
UNDP 
ArCo (2004) 
132 (2006) 
125 (2004-06) 
72 (1995 – 2000) 
162 (1990 & 2000) 
 
KEI 
Tech 
TAI 
ArCo 
Mobile phones per 100 pop 
 
Mobile phones per 1000 pop 
 
WEF hard data 
WEF hard data 
ArCo (2004) 
125 (2004-06) 
125 (2004-06) 
162 (1990 & 2000) 
 
Tech 
TechRead 
ArCo 
PC per 1000 population 
PC users per 100 population 
 
K4D 
WEF hard data 
WEF hard data 
 
132 (2006) 
125 (2004-06) 
125 (2004-06) 
 
KEI 
Tech 
TechRead 
Internet users per 1000 pop 
Internet hosts per 10000 pop  
Internet hosts per 10000 pop  
Internet users per 10000 pop 
 
K4D 
WEF hard data 
UNDP 
WEF hard data 
WEF hard data 
ArCo (2004) 
 
132 (2006) 
125 (2004-06) 
72 (1995 – 2000) 
125 (2004-06) 
125 (2004-06) 
162 (1990 & 2000) 
 
KEI 
Tech 
TAI 
Tech 
TechRead 
ArCo 
Capacity of the institutions to create a propitious 
environment for the diffusion and efficient use of 
ICTs 
WEF opinion survey 125 (2004-06) 
 
Tech 
ICT laws 
 
WEF opinion survey 125 (2004-06) 
 
TechRead 
IPRs WEF opinion survey 125 (2004-06) 
 
TechInnov 
 
INPUT-RELATED 
VARIABLES 
Receipts of royalty and license fees 
 
UNDP 72 (1995 – 2000) 
 
TAI 
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Secondary school enrolment 
 
K4D 
UNCTAD 
 
132 (2006) 
117 (1995 & 2001) 
 
KEI 
UNICI 
University enrolment 
Tertiary enrolment rate 
 
K4D 
WEF hard data 
132 (2006) 
125 (2004-06) 
 
KEI 
Tech 
Literacy rate as % pop UNCTAD 
ArCo (2004) 
 
117 (1995 & 2001) 
162 (1990 & 2000) 
 
UNICI 
ArCo 
Years of schooling 
 
UNDP 
ArCo (2004) 
72 (1995 – 2000) 
162 (1990 & 2000) 
 
TAI 
ArCo 
Tertiary science enrolment UNDP 
UNCTAD 
ArCo (2004) 
 
72 (1995 – 2000) 
117 (1995 & 2001) 
162 (1990 & 2000) 
 
TAI 
UNICI 
ArCo 
Scientific & engineering graduates (% labour 
force) 
EUROSTAT+CIS 48 (2006) 
 
 
GSII 
 
Researcher per million population EUROSTAT+CIS 
K4D 
UNCTAD 
 
48 (2006) 
132 (2006) 
117 (1995 & 2001) 
 
GSII 
KEI 
UNICI 
Scientists and engineers availability 
 
WEF opinion survey 125 (2004-06) 
 
TechInnov 
Public demand for high-tech products WEF opinion survey 125 (2004-06) 
 
TechInnov 
Research cooperation activities between 
universities and firms 
 
WEF opinion survey 
WEF opinion survey 
125 (2004-06) 
125 (2004-06) 
Tech 
TechInnov 
Quality of research institutions 
 
WEF opinion survey 125 (2004-06) 
 
TechInnov 
FDI WEF opinion survey 125 (2004-06) 
 
TechRead 
Patents per million pop. 
(USTPO) 
(EPO for GSII)  
 
 
 
National patents 
EUROSTAT+CIS 
K4D 
WEF hard data 
WEF hard data 
UNCTAD 
ArCo (2004) 
UNDP 
48 (2006) 
132 (2006) 
125 (2004-06) 
125 (2004-06) 
117 (1995 & 2001) 
162 (1990 & 2000) 
72 (1995 – 2000) 
GSII 
KEI 
Tech 
TechInnov 
UNICI 
ArCo  
TAI 
 
Medium- and high-tech exports 
 
UNDP 72 (1995 – 2000) 
 
TAI 
Scientific articles per million population EUROSTAT+CIS 
K4D 
UNCTAD 
ArCo (2004) 
 
48 (2006) 
132 (2006) 
117 (1995 & 2001) 
162 (1990 & 2000) 
 
GSII 
KEI 
UNICI 
ArCo 
Share of exports in high-tech industries (% total 
exports) 
EUROSTAT+CIS 48 (2006) 
 
 
GSII 
 
Share of VA in high-tech industries (% TVA) EUROSTAT+CIS 48 (2006) 
 
GSII 
 
Manufacturing value added  
(Industrial Capacity-MVApc) 
 
UNIDO 122 (2000 & 2005) CIP 
Manufactured exports per capita 
(Mfg Export Capacity-MXpc) 
 
UNIDO 
 
122 (2000 & 2005) CIP 
Share of MHT in MVA 
(Industrialization Intensity-MVAsh) 
 
UNIDO  161 (1990 & 2002) 
122 (2000 & 2005) 
ITA (TechAd) 
CIP 
Share of MHT exports in total manufactured 
exports 
(Export Quality-MHXsh) 
 
UNIDO  161 (1990 & 2002) 
122 (2000 & 2005) 
ITA (TechAd) 
CIP 
Share of MVA in GDP 
(Industrialization Intensity-MHVAsh) 
 
UNIDO  161 (1990 & 2002) 
122 (2000 & 2005) 
ITA (IndAd) 
CIP 
 
OUTPUT-RELATED 
VARIABLES 
Share of mfg exports in total exports 
(Export Quality-MXsh) 
 
UNIDO  161 (1990 & 2002) 
122 (2000 & 2005) 
ITA (IndAd) 
CIP 
Note 1: SII and STI are not reported as the available databases include less than 40 countries. 
 
Note 2: the ArCo Index is included in the menu as it is developed by re-elaborating the TAI and the IDS indexes. The variables selected allow for coverage of 162 countries for 
the years 1990 and 2000. See Archibugi and Coco (2004).                         
Source: Author. 
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However, if we focus on the 45 countries (G45) for which a number of indicators are available 
(last year available), we discover that the position of countries is relatively stable with only few 
exceptions. Given a selected set of productive capabilities indicators (Archibugi et al., 2009b), 
Table 13 shows the position, mean and standard deviation for the cluster of G45 countries.  
 
Table 13 Ranking of the G45 countries based on a selection of synthetic indicators  
 
Source: Archibugi et. al. (2009b:19). 
 
 
Finally, for the same cluster of countries (G45), the following Table 14 presents the correlation 
matrix among the productive capabilities indicators selected. Clearly, the correlation 
coefficients are very high for homogenous groups of productive capabilities indicators. 
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Table 14 The correlation matrix among the main productive capabilities indicators 
 
  Source: Archibugi et. al. (2009b:20). 
 
2.3. Trade-based indicators: Product complexity rankings and cross-country 
comparisons   
Given the extensive and disaggregated information on products that enter international markets, 
only few scholars have recently proposed a set of indirect measures of countries’ productive 
capabilities. As we have seen, traditional indicators are based on factor input data (extracted 
from input-output tables or industrial censuses typically available at the 2-digit level) and 
technological intensity (mainly based on R&D expenditure). In contrast, trade-based indicators 
only require information on the exports of each product and per capita incomes of exporting 
countries. Trade-based indicators seek to classify exports and to consequently rank countries 
according to their export basket. The different methodologies proposed share a common 
analytical starting point28, namely: 
• The complexity/sophistication of a product is a function of the productive 
capabilities it requires; 
• The higher the average income of an exporter, the more sophisticated the export 
(assumption); 
• By looking at countries’ export baskets, we can infer the degree of 
complexity/sophistication of a country’s technological and productive structure. 
 
                                                 
28
 The indicators developed by the Harvard research group on economic complexity are also applied to 
define the so-called ‘product space’. The theoretical building blocks of this approach are detailed in the 
following sections. 
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This section reviews the three best known methodologies29: the first one is that introduced by 
Lall et al. (Lall et al., 2005; see also UNIDO, 2009); the last two have been recently developed 
by the Harvard research group on economic complexity. The method of reflections has been 
proposed by the Harvard group to resolve the fundamental problem of ‘circularity’, that is, ‘rich 
countries export rich-countries product’ (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009). This problem is 
attributable to the fact that the degree of complexity/sophistication of a given product is 
extrapolated from an ‘income content’ measure, rather than from an ‘engineering content’ 
measure (Felipe et al., 2010). 
 
2.3.1 The ‘Sophistication’ index  
The Sophistication index has been designed to calculate sophistication at different levels of 
disaggregation and for different purposes. At the product level, the ‘soph score’ is calculated by 
taking the weighted average of exporters’ income (the weights being each country’s shares of 
world export). Lall et al. (2006) ran this exercise for products at the 3-digit and 4-digit level 
(SITC Rev 2) for 1990 and 2000. To obtain the average value for exporters’ income, countries 
are divided into 10 income groups for each year (allowing for changes in the groups’ 
composition). Finally, they ‘multiply the share in world exports of each product for each income 
group by the group’s average income to get a dollar value for each product’ (for an example, see 
Lall et al., 2006:224). Interestingly, by matching the indicator of sophistication with that of 
technology intensity (measured as R&D/sales ratio) they are also able to identify: (i) situations 
in which high sophistication does not equate with technological depth; (ii) patterns of 
fragmentation in production processes when we observe a combination of high technology with 
low sophistication (see Table 15).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 Previous research and methodologies have relied on trade-based data. See, for example, the classical 
work by Michaely (1984). See also Alcorta and Peres (1995: 5). The latter proposes a Technology 
Specialization Index which depicts ‘how much any particular country or region adapts its trade structure 
to changing patterns of world trade in high and low technology products’.   
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Table 15 Export sophistication and technology intensity 
 
Source: Lall et al. (2006:226). 
 
At the country level, as part of a competitiveness assessment, the ‘soph index’ can complement 
the analysis of changes in world market shares (WMS). In particular, a country’s export basket 
can be differentiated by level of sophistication of the products contained in the basket. At an 
aggregate level, the index can also be adapted as a measure of export similarity among 
countries. Finally, the ‘soph index’ can be used as a benchmark tool. An example is provided by 
Lall et al. (2006:234) who point out how ‘the direction of deviation [of a given country] from 
the predicted relation within a particular industry or category may be revealing of underlying 
trends’. For example, a country’s upgrading is apparent when the difference between a 
country’s actual soph score and the one predicted by its income level increases.   
 
2.3.2 The PRODY index and the method of reflections 
The indicators developed by Hausmann et al. (2007:2) are rooted in the idea that ‘countries 
become what they produce’. This means that economic development is primarily a process of 
learning how to produce (and export) increasingly complex/sophisticated products. In other 
words, it is a process of productive capabilities building and accumulation.  
 
In such a setting, the PRODY is developed as a quantitative index that ranks traded goods 
according to the income levels of the countries that export them. For each product k, the 
PRODYk is calculated as a weighted average of the income per capita of the countries exporting 
the product.  
 
The country j has a GDP per capita equal to Yj, while its total export is equal to the sum of 
products l in the overall export basket, Xj = Σj xjl. In the PRODY, the weight is the index of 
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revealed comparative advantage (RCA) and is calculated as the ratio of the value share of the 
product in a country’s overall export basket (xjk / Xj) to the sum of all value shares across all 
countries exporting that product Σj (xjk / Xj). The PRODY is measured in 2005 PPP $. 
 
 
                               RCA 
 
At the country level, the EXPY index is simply calculated as a weighted average of the 
complexity of products exported by the country (measured by the PRODY index). The weight is 
the share of the product in the country’s export basket.  
 
As anticipated above, to respond to the criticism that the PRODY index is afflicted by a 
fundamental problem of ‘logical circularity’, Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) recently developed 
a new methodology called ‘method of reflections’. This method aims to separate the 
information derived from income levels and that drawn from the network structure of countries 
and the products exported. The authors present the idea behind their new method using the Lego 
models as an analogy. Each productive capability in a country is seen as a Lego piece in the 
country ‘Lego box’. Accordingly, countries will only be able to manufacture those products for 
which they have the necessary productive capabilities (Lego pieces). Thus, countries’ 
diversification in production (and export) depends on the limited set of activities their 
productive capabilities allow them to perform. Moreover, as certain commodities require special 
and exclusive productive capabilities, we can expect that some products are exported by fewer 
(less ubiquitous) countries. This observation has been empirically tested by representing the 
network of relatedness between products – i.e. product space (Hidalgo et. al, 2007; Hidalgo and 
Hausmann, 2009). Network analysis has shown that ‘countries tend to move to goods close to 
those they are currently specialized in, allowing nations in more connected parts of the product 
space to upgrade their exports basket more quickly’ (Hidalgo et. al, 2007:1).This approach 
builds on the same intuition we find in Richardson (1972), who determined that there are 
products whose embedded productive capabilities can be easily redeployed for similar 
productive activities, while other productive capabilities (which are quite exclusive) can only be 
used in a limited range of productive processes. Given this framework, Hidalgo and Hausmann 
(2009:10573) develop two complexity measures for both countries and products: 
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• Diversification: number of products that a country exports with RCA 
    
• Ubiquity: number of countries that export the product with RCA 
 
where c denotes the country, p the product and Mcp = 1, if country c exports product p with RCA 
or Mcp = 0 otherwise. By calculating these two measures jointly and iteratively, the two 
measures of complexity are refined step by step as they take into account the information from 
the previous iterations, for N ≥ 1 
 
 
 
The results obtained by adopting this methodology are explained by the theoretical framework 
developed by Hausmann and Hidalgo (2010). Their model not only shows that countries with a 
limited set of capabilities will be able to manufacture few products, but also that the process of 
accumulation of additional capabilities is characterized by increasing returns dynamics. Clearly, 
the explanation has to be found in the fact that ‘the likelihood that a new capability will be able 
to synergize with existing capabilities and become useful for the production of a new product is 
low in the absence of the other requisite capabilities’ (Hausmann and Hidalgo, 2010:25). On the 
contrary, countries with a broader set of available capabilities would greatly benefit from the 
acquisition of an additional capability, which has the greatest potential for as many  
combinations with the other capabilities they possess30.  
  
2.4 A comparative analysis of trade-based indicators 
Some of the results obtained by adopting the set of indicators discussed in section 2.3 are 
reported below.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
 A similar approach is developed in Andreoni (2010) and Andreoni and Scazzieri (2011). However, the 
former focuses on the development of a capability theory of production while the latter focuses on the 
identification of the triggers of increasing and decreasing returns. 
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Table 16 Regional sophistication scores (ranked by 2000 scores) 
 
Source: Lall et al. (2005:13). 
 
 
Table 17 Top and bottom world exports in sophistication at the 4-digit level, 2000 
 
Source: Lall et al. (2006:228). 
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Table 18 Share in country’s total exports, by product complexity 
 
 
Source: Felipe et al. (forthcoming:23). 
 
 
 
Table 19 List of 10 most complex products 
 
 
Source: adjusted from Felipe et al. (forthcoming:23). 
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3.  Towards new industrial diagnostics for policy design 
3.1 Measurement with or without theory: Methodological problems and 
informative limits 
 
For capability indicators to be meaningful, the assumptions made for their construction as well 
as their informative limits need to be known. Actually, the more synthetic indicators are 
grounded in a thorough analytical framework, the more informative and testable they are. 
Moreover, by comparing/integrating the information they provide with other pieces of 
quantitative and qualitative evidence (e.g. disaggregated data on sector-specific and/or firm-
specific productive capabilities), a stylized representation of productive capabilities dynamics 
and the resulting competitiveness performances is possible. Building indicators without theory 
has various shortcomings31. For example, variables tend to be selected more on the basis of data 
availability rather than their informative content. Secondly, overly composite indicators are 
generated under the assumption that more ingredients will provide the cake with a better taste 
(Lall, 2001; UNIDO, 2002). Thirdly, indicators tend to be adopted by practitioners and 
policymakers in an uncritical way – i.e. list disease without realizing that these measures are 
mainly proxies of extremely complex and multilayered processes (Archibugi, 1988). Therefore, 
some key methodological considerations have to be made. Being aware of the theoretical 
assumptions and methodological problems is extremely helpful for the refinement of current 
indicators and the identification of new industrial diagnostics for policy design.  
 
Productive capabilities: ‘Determinants’ and ‘enablers’ 
Firms are socially-structured production units characterized by certain technological and 
organizational knowledge bases. As discussed in section 1.2.1, the same knowledge resources 
can provide different services. This implies that firms with the same technological and 
organizational knowledge basis can actually manifest and develop different capabilities in 
production. Thus, widely used variables such as expenditure in R&D, investments in capital 
goods and licenses and various indicators of worker quality (e.g. literacy rates) appear to be 
‘proxies of determinants of capability rather than indicators of capability itself’ (Romijn, 
1999:3). The reason is that productive capabilities are not simply prepackaged stocks of 
codified knowledge. Instead, given a certain amount of knowledge resources, capabilities 
continuously develop in a circular and cumulative manner through micro-learning processes 
                                                 
31 For a detailed discussion of methodological problems and informative limitations, see also Archibugi 
and Coco (2005); Archibugi et al. (2009a), while Godin (2007) discusses the link between input and 
output measures and the functional model of production.  
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(Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Andreoni, 2010). This also implies that productive capabilities 
indicators should not simply attempt to capture the knowledge basis of firms – i.e. determinants 
of capabilities, but also those factors external to the firm that affect learning processes – i.e. 
enablers of productive capabilities building.  
 
This approach would allow us to better capture those disembodied capabilities, forms of tacit 
knowledge and conscious decisions by the agents involved in technological learning which are 
responsible for the heterogeneity we observe among firms and, ultimately, for their different 
degrees of competitiveness. Moreover, the recognition that the same determinants, that is, the 
same stock of technological and organizational knowledge, may drive different patterns of 
productive capabilities building/accumulation suggests that the information provided by these 
indicators is interpreted in a non-deterministic way. As stressed by Katz (2006: 897) ‘Unlike 
some physical processes social activities are never completely deterministic nor are they 
completely random’. It is therefore extremely important to identify causal structures and the set 
of causational chains that regulate development processes. 
 
Learning processes in historical time: Time lags and time scales 
Learning proceeds in historical time and is technological/sector-specific (Rosenberg, 1994; Bell, 
2006; Andreoni, 2010). This means that indicators which fail to consider the existence of time 
lags and technological/sector-specific characteristics will provide a very misleading picture of 
the capabilities owned by countries’ productive/technological structures (and by firms as their 
components). For example, let’s consider a firm like Nokia in its first years of high-tech 
production. A capability indicator based on output variables would only convince us that 
Nokia’s story is an incontrovertible one of continued business failure, as it did not make any 
profit in high-tech production for nearly two decades32. Productive capabilities development 
takes time and is cumulative, and hence, relying solely on output variables does not allow us to 
capture the ongoing learning process, the result of which will eventually be registered by our 
output-based indicator in the future. In other words, ‘there may be intensive processes of 
knowledge acquisition under way that are not yet reflected in economic outcomes, for example, 
in trade patterns’ (OECD, 2006:201). However, relying on input-based measures only does not 
resolve the time lag problem, either. Without registering the tremendous success of Nokia in the 
output (e.g. competitiveness performances), we would not have had any way of determining 
whether Nokia had a learning-rich or learning-poor experience. 
                                                 
32
 Interestingly, the learning trajectory from industry entry point to the initiation of significant innovation 
was around 20 years, e.g. in the case of Samsung (Bell, 2006:29). 
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Even if we recognize the existence of time lags and thus of qualitative transformations and 
discontinuities, truncations and reverses, we are still quite far from an explicit treatment of the 
time/stages firms require to build productive capabilities and to consequently move from low- to 
medium- and high-tech industries – i.e. time scales33. From a managerial as well as a policy 
design perspective, it becomes crucial to find stylized answers to questions such as ‘over what 
time period must the investments in specific kinds of productive capabilities be made?’ or 
‘when will the returns be realized?’, and finally ‘what factors might affect those time scales (e.g. 
learning faster/slower)?’. Possible answers can be drawn from detailed long-term longitudinal 
studies and/or in tracking changes over time. This, of course, calls for the collection of time-
series data. In this respect, synthetic indicators should be developed to capture the rate of 
change of key variables more than their level at any particular moment. 
 
Factors aggregation: Weights, complementarities and correlations 
Many factors are included in the development of productive capabilities as determinants or 
enablers. Thus, capabilities indicators very often tend to aggregate multiple variables which 
proxy these factors. As we will see, capability indicators frequently conflate input-based 
variables with output-based variables, a choice which exacerbates aggregation problems (Lall, 
2001; Grupp and Mogee, 2004; OECD, 2008). Composite indicators are characterized by two 
fundamental aggregation problems (Kaplan, 2004). On the one hand, when the importance of 
each component – i.e. its weight – is the result of an ex ante subjective evaluation, the same data 
set can provide entirely different information. On the other hand, the choice of aggregating 
different components (especially mixing input-based and output-based variables) derives from 
the assumption that they are substitutable.  
 
Even when avoiding overly composite indicators, productive capabilities indicators which 
aggregate only ‘proxies of determinants of capabilities’ – i.e. input-based variables – are equally 
subject to aggregation problems. The various factors should be available according to a certain 
degree of proportionality in order to obtain the intended productive outcomes and achieve 
certain levels of competitiveness. For example, increasing R&D investment for the building of 
new labs without proportionately raising the amount of engineers universities can graduate will 
not have the expected impact on technological capabilities development.  
                                                 
33
 See Katz (1987) for a collection of initial attempts to identify technological learning stages and 
respective time scales. Bell (2006) provides a retrospective critique of the technological capability 
literature which focuses excessively on cross-sectional differences instead of on an explicit treatment of 
time scales. 
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As a result of existing complementarities among given factors (which reveal underlying 
structural relationships), variables in composite indicators are very often highly correlated. For 
example, ‘countries with a high share of graduates have at the same time a high rate of scientific 
publications, patents and so on’ (Archibugi et al., 2009a:3). These correlations suggest that 
capabilities determinants and enablers complement each other, although their interdependencies 
cannot be read as causal links or as a set of deterministic relationships (UNIDO, 2002:59-60). In 
this respect, cross-correlation tables may be compiled with the different proxies, which enter 
indicators of capabilities determinants and capabilities enablers or output-based indicators. In 
fact, when looking at the resulting correlation matrixes, we might, for example, discover that 
correlations between various factors such as R&D and output differ substantially at different 
stages of development. This result would suggest that R&D activities play a distinctive role in 
determining the competitiveness performance of countries at different stages of development. In 
fact, the distinct histories of countries’ industrialization demonstrate how capabilities 
determinants and enablers (as well as the resulting productive capabilities) can be combined in 
various ways in line with different development strategies and paths.    
 
Levels of aggregation and disaggregation 
Productive capabilities are embedded in physical agents – i.e. machines and workers – as well 
as in organizational configurations and institutional arrangements. According to the loci where 
they reside as well as the degree of aggregation considered – i.e. individual agent, collective 
agent (e.g. organizations) or systemic (e.g. regional, national level) – different capabilities 
indicators should be developed. The reason behind this is that productive capabilities indicators 
at different levels of aggregation – i.e. firm, sectoral, regional, country level – provide distinct 
information for benchmarking and industrial policy design. As a matter of fact, national level 
indicators tend to conceal important sectoral and regional differences while sectoral indicators 
conceal important firm differences (see Figure 5).  
 
The multilevel analysis we envisage here is further complicated by the fact that productive 
capabilities at different levels – i.e. firm, sectoral, regional, country level – are interrelated with 
each other in different ways in accordance with specific country characteristics. In this respect, 
the concept of social capabilities introduced above seems to capture the country-specific way 
through which linkages among different capable entities work, develop and cluster. One 
particular subset of these linkages is that which connects firms embedded in the same regional 
innovation system or firms which are part of global production networks (GPNs). The spread of 
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GPNs poses serious challenges in terms of the usefulness of country level indicators. This 
notwithstanding, as governments’ policies operate at the national level, we should integrate 
national level productive capability indicators with other appropriate diagnostics. 
 
Figure 5 Productive capabilities indicators in a 3 sectors, 2 countries model 
 
Source: Author. 
 
Cross-countries comparability and scale adjustments 
International comparisons are particularly difficult when countries involved are at different 
stages of development. Not only are countries at different stages of development endowed with 
various degrees of productive and technological capabilities, but their capabilities most 
probably vary as the technologies employed in production differ. This implies that cross-country 
comparisons can be more useful if conducted among groups of countries which are at the same 
stage of development, that is, countries with similar production/technological structures. The 
selection of various groups of countries may either result from the application of cluster analysis 
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techniques or from selecting groups of countries on the basis of development level indicators. 
For example, highly reliable and more detailed databases are available for OECD countries.  
 
According to these different clusters of countries, various group-specific sets of productive 
capability indicators can be developed. By following this strategy, more refined measurements 
can be elaborated and, hence, more detailed cross-country comparative and convergence 
analyses performed – e.g. the European integration process. However, comparisons need to be 
normalized. Recent research denotes that ‘a performance indicator derived from a ratio that 
exhibits a scaling correlation between the numerator and denominator must be scale-adjusted 
before it is used in comparisons’ (Katz, 2006:895). Thus, all time indicators rely on ratios such 
as GERD/GDP, GDP/population or citations/paper, and although the denominator is a measure 
of size, we cannot simply assume that the indicator is normalized by the denominator.  
 
3.2 A new set of indicators for the assessment of country-level productive 
capabilities 
The analysis provided above reveals the numerous limits of today’s available country-level 
synthetic indicators, but also proposes possible solutions and areas of improvement. In fact, 
some of the shortcomings highlighted, such as the fact of using overly composite indicators or 
measures which do not incorporate time lags and time scales, might be avoided. Building on the 
theoretical and empirical analysis provided so far, this section suggests a new set of indicators 
and methodologies to assess and compare country-level productive capabilities. The research 
carried out to date on productive and technological capabilities has not been able to develop a 
comprehensive and consistent analytical framework and a set of suitable indicators. On the 
contrary, many ideas and concepts have been attached to the word capabilities in an attempt to 
capture all possible capability dimensions at different levels of aggregation (see section 1.2). 
However, there is wide acceptance of the fact that productive capabilities result from learning 
processes in production. Although it is practically impossible to quantify all the complex and 
multilayered learning processes through which a given country’s productive capabilities 
develop, the second best strategy would be to identify, distinguish and group the most important 
factors that enter, interact with and exit from these learning processes (provided that the 
necessary data is available).  
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Productive Capabilities Indicators (PCI) 
The new of set of productive capabilities indicators proposed here builds on four factors, 
namely capability determinants, capability enablers, capability outcomes and production 
outputs. The analytical framework describing how these factors relate to each other is illustrated 
in Figure 6. 
 
• Capability determinants 
A set of ‘input factors’, such as technical education and R&D spending, represent 
‘knowledge ingredients’ in learning processes. These knowledge ingredients are 
primarily human capital and investments in the acquisition of codified knowledge 
(e.g. design and engineering specifications for machineries). Before turning into 
productive and technological capabilities, these knowledge ingredients have to first 
be processed, transformed and adapted by those actors engaged in production in 
firms. A broad range of machines, equipment and firm infrastructures, all of which 
are elements that define the production capacity of a given firm, complement these 
actors. In fact, as discussed in section 1.2.2, the transformation of knowledge 
ingredients in productive capabilities would not be possible without a series of 
strategic investments aiming at the expansion of production capacity. Thus, the set 
of input factors entering the learning processes in production must be proxied by a 
series of information which captures the presence of ‘knowledge ingredients’ and 
the ‘production capacity’ at the country level. Taken together, ‘knowledge 
ingredients’ and ‘production capacity’ constitute what we call the capability 
determinants (see Figure 6).  
 
• Capability enablers 
The firm-level process of productive capabilities development, its speed, 
effectiveness and multi-directionality are affected by the presence (absence) of a 
series of ‘mediating factors’ which are country-specific. These mediating factors, 
mainly infrastructures such as roads, railways, port network systems, public 
research infrastructures and ICTs, act as facilitating factors rather than directly 
entering the firm-level process of productive capabilities building. In other words, 
by reducing transaction costs (e.g. transportation costs of machinery or technicians 
exchange) and learning costs (e.g. increasing absorption capacities with ICTs, faster 
diffusion of productive best practices) these factors enable processes of productive 
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capabilities building and accumulation at firm level. They are referred to here as 
capability enablers.  
 
To recap, processes of productive capabilities building and accumulation are triggered by two 
groups of input factors which we refer to here as ‘capability determinants’ and ‘capability 
enablers’, respectively. The main reason for distinguishing between these two groups of input 
factors is that they play different roles in productive capabilities building. Another reason 
behind this is that input factors, being determinants or enablers, are linked more by a 
relationship of complementarity than one of substitutability (see also sections 1.2.2 and 3.1). In 
fact, by developing sub-indicators for investments in production capacity on the one hand, and 
sub-indicators for knowledge ingredients (mainly investments in human capital), on the other, it 
is also possible to analyse the relationships of complementarity that exist among the input 
factors grouped into capabilities determinants. Clearly, at the country level, investments in 
production capacity and investments aimed at increasing the amount of knowledge ingredients 
available to firms (typically, human capital) call for different forms of policy intervention. 
 
• Production outputs and capability outcomes 
According to the amount and quality of capabilities determinants and capability 
enablers available in a certain country, and given the ability of its entrepreneurs to 
identify and capture productive opportunities, individual firms (or groups of firms):  
- Will be able to undertake production processes in a certain combination of 
sectors and industries;  
- Will experience cumulative processes of learning and productive capabilities 
building triggered by ‘internal compulsions’ in production (Rosenberg, 1969 and 
1972);  
- Will be continually reshaped by processes of ‘creative destruction’ 
(Schumpeter, 1932).  
 
As a result of these dynamics, a certain amount of productive capabilities develop and 
accumulate, while others are simply transformed or even lost. In turn, the new developed and 
accumulated productive capabilities, referred to here as capability outcomes, are continuously 
reinserted in production and affect the same learning processes from which they have been 
derived – i.e. feedback mechanisms. Given the fact that the firm-level dynamics generating 
capability outcomes are extremely complex and interconnected, measuring the amount of 
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capability outcomes generated in a certain country and time period turns out to be particularly 
difficult. Two strategies are proposed here. 
 
Firstly, as shown by trade-based indicators (see section 2.3), the development and accumulation 
of productive capabilities at the country level is ‘reflected’ in its productive outputs, that is, in 
the basket of commodities produced and internationally traded. The latter can be proxied by 
considering the specialization of a given country in the production of certain commodities with 
a certain degree of complexity or by looking at output indexes such as MVA, also disaggregated 
for low-, medium- and high-tech sectors34. Thus, these productive outputs are indirect measures 
of the productive capabilities developed and employed in production by the set of firms 
producing in a certain country.  
 
However, there are few capability outcomes such as new products, new machineries or new 
blueprints that can be directly measured. The reason is that these kinds of capabilities outcomes 
tend to be codified and, when possible, patented. In fact, capability outcomes such as patents 
become part of the stock of knowledge ingredients which triggers the initial process of learning 
in production – i.e. the feedback mechanisms. Thus, there are a set of directly measurable 
capability outcomes that re-enter the learning in production process as new capability 
determinants.  
 
Figure 6 A new analytical framework for country-level productive capabilities indicators 
 
Source: Author. 
                                                 
34
 For any given country, the patterns of specialization and diversification followed by its firms will 
determine their technological and productive structure. 
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To recap, the new methodology suggested here focuses on three direct measures of productive 
capabilities – i.e. capability determinants (CD), capability enablers (CE) and capability 
outcomes (CO) – and one indirect measure of country-level capability outcomes – i.e. 
production outputs (PO). The possible variables and data sources that are included in the 
construction of each composite indicator are synthesized in the following Table 20.  
 
Table 20 Composite indicators for capability determinants, capability enablers, capability 
outcomes and production outputs 
 
 
PRODUCTIVE CAPABILITIES INDICATORS (PCI) 
 
DIRECT MEASURES INDIRECT MEASURES 
Capability Determinants CDIndex Capability Enablers CEIndex Capability Outcomes 
COIndex 
Production Outputs POIndex 
R&D expenditure by  
productive enterprises 
(per capita and as a % of GNP) 
R&D public expenditure 
(per capita and as a % of GDP) 
Patents taken out in the US 
(per 1000 people) 
 
Industrial intensity  
(as calculated for the CIP) 
Secondary and tertiary 
education 
Traditional infrastructure 
(e.g. commercial energy use) 
ISO certificates  
(per 1000 people) 
 
Export quality 
(as calculated for the CIP) 
Vocational students 
(as a % of population) 
 
Personal computers  
(per 1000 people) 
Product complexity and 
diversification  
(e.g. export baskets) 
 
Tertiary technical  
enrolments 
(as a % of population) 
Internet hosts  
(per 1000 people) 
  
Graduates in science and 
engineering 
(as a % of population) 
Mobile phones  
(per 1000 people) 
  
 
E 
N 
D 
O 
G 
E 
N 
O 
U 
S 
 
E 
F 
F 
O 
R 
T 
 
 Telephone mainlines 
(per 1000 people) 
  
Royalty and licences  
payments  
(per capita and as a % of GDP) 
 
   
FDI inward per capita  
 
 
   
 
I 
M 
P 
O 
R 
T 
E 
D 
 
Capital goods import  
per capita 
 
   
Note: The list of variables for each composite indicator is not definitive as various tests (e.g. correlations among variables) have to be performed 
to confirm that these variables can be used as a proxy for each of the dimensions selected: CD, CE, CO and PO.  
     Source: Author. 
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Benchmarking, ranking, cross-country comparisons and the analysis of trajectories 
Given the fact that the four productive capabilities indicators proposed here are modular, it is 
possible: 
(i) To add variables into homogenous groups of factors, namely capability 
‘determinants’, ‘enablers’, ‘outcomes’ and production ‘outputs’; 
(ii) To consider the interaction among different sets of variables inside each group. 
For example, the CDIndex might be disaggregated to separately analyse (and in 
an interacting way) the ‘knowledge ingredients’ component from the 
‘investment in production capacity’ component. This makes it possible to 
determine the existence of mismatches between the two sets of complementary 
input factors as well as whether the industrial policies have been oriented 
mostly towards one component or the other. Another possibility is to aggregate 
input factors according to their origin, in particular by distinguishing capability 
determinants that are endogenously generated from those which are imported 
from other countries (the latter typically being technology acquisitions of 
codified knowledge measured by royalty payments or production equipment 
measured by capital goods imports).    
(iii) To integrate the set of indicators developed with other available sets. For its 
theoretical and methodological premises, the most immediate integration is the 
one with UNIDO’s Industrial Development Scoreboard (see section 2.1.7.2). 
Specifically, if we substitute the Production Output Index (POI) with the index 
of Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP), we obtain an updated version of 
the IDS which combines the CIP as an output measure with the three composite 
indexes for capabilities determinants (CDI), capabilities enablers (CEI) and 
capabilities outcomes (COI).  
 
The set of possibilities listed above mainly refers to benchmarking and ranking countries as 
well as performing cross-countries comparisons at each point in time. However, the Productive 
Capabilities Indicators (PCI) can also be adopted with time-series data for performing different 
longitudinal analyses (see section 3.1 on the importance of considering time lags and time 
scales) and cluster analyses35. As illustrative cases of the many possibilities offered by these 
indicators, the paper stylizes the following possible analytical exercises: 
                                                 
35
 Cluster analysis is a statistical technique for identifying relatively homogenous groups of cases (e.g. 
countries) according to their quantitative features (e.g. a certain level of capability determinants). 
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(i) PCI can be used to evaluate industrial development precursors, that is, the 
‘starting point conditions’ in terms of productive capabilities shown by a given 
country at a certain stage of development. Interestingly, the latter can be 
proxied by levels of income per capita, but also by more production-based 
measures such as the composition of the export basket as well as the stage of 
industrial development measured by MVA; 
(ii) Given certain initial conditions, PCI can be used as a focusing device for the 
identification of those clusters of countries that experience ‘learning-rich’ vs. 
‘learning-poor’ experiences (e.g. fast growth of POI with a relatively slow 
growth of CDI); 
(iii) PCI can be used for tracking the process of productive capabilities accumulation 
followed by a given country over time (as illustrated in Figure 7). In other 
words, it is possible to track how the relationships between CD, CE, CO, PO 
change over time; 
(iv) PCI can be used as a focusing device for the identification of those clusters of 
countries that experience unbalanced patterns of productive capabilities 
accumulation (e.g. high-sustained CEI and low/discontinuous CDI); 
(v) PCI can complement structural change analysis by displaying the different 
patterns of productive capabilities accumulation underlying the transformation 
of the productive/technological structure of a given country over time (see 
Figure 8).   
  
Figure 7 Tracking the relationships among different factors over time 
 
 
Source: Author. 
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Figure 8 Patterns of structural change and productive capabilities accumulation 
 
 
Source: Author. 
 
Further research needs to be carried out to test these new methodologies and compare the results 
obtained with other similar direct and indirect indicators of productive capabilities. 
 
3.3 Disaggregated diagnostics: Industry-specific and firm-level productive 
capabilities 
Productive capabilities development in some industries (e.g. manufacturing/capital goods 
production) is more complex than in others (e.g. process industries). For example, the fact that 
firms in manufacturing industries have the necessary tools to self-construct machinery for their 
own use or upgrade and recondition second hand machinery opens a broad range of 
opportunities for in-house technical change as well as productive capabilities building and 
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accumulation (Rosenberg, 1969, 1976, 1982; Romijn, 1999)36. Thus, capability indicators have 
to be constructed taking into account the specificities of different industries determined by each 
industry’s productive capabilities requirements, knowledge base, divisibility of tasks and 
modularity, scale and time constraints, materials in use, etc. (Pavitt, 1984). These differences 
remain obscured by the typical 2-digit level analysis. Unfortunately, data sets at the 3 and 4-
digit levels that cover a broad range of countries are extremely rare for all sectors, even for more 
advanced economies37. Interestingly, recent innovation indexes have begun introducing sectoral 
and sub-sectoral differentiations on the basis of detailed national surveys. The NESTA (2009) 
research work for the UK productive/technological structure exemplifies this tendency. 
 
This paper suggests two possible strategies to analyse industry-specific productive capabilities 
and, thus, the construction of indicators with meaningful technological contents. Both strategies 
are based on a common analytical framework which is consistent with structuralist analyses of 
production processes (Scazzieri, 1993; Landesmann and Scazzieri, 1996; Andreoni, 2010). 
These approaches open the black box of production by describing it as a specific network of 
interrelated tasks through which transformations of materials are performed according to 
different patterns of capabilities coordination and are subject to certain scale and time 
conditions. Thus, three analytical focuses are identified, namely the set of tasks performed in a 
process (space of tasks T), the set of materials transformed (space of materials M) and, finally, 
the set of productive capabilities (capabilities space C) necessary for performing that specific 
production process. These three spaces are visualized in Figure 9.  
 
The first approach for measuring industry-specific capabilities is based on the idea that focusing 
on the set of tasks that have to be performed to produce a certain commodity allows us to infer 
on the specific capabilities owned by a generic firm in the given industry – i.e. a task complexity 
benchmark. A refined methodology based on the task complexity benchmark approach is 
developed by Romijn (1999). This study is a best practice example of a firm-level in-depth 
survey on productive capabilities. Here, an adjusted indicator is developed based on a survey of 
small metal working firms in developing countries. The measurements are obtained as a 
combination of inputs variables (e.g. machines, personnel) and output variables (e.g. degree of 
manufacturing complexity). The reason why input-related variables are not sufficient and, 
consequently, have to be complemented by output variables – i.e. product range and complexity 
                                                 
36
 This is another reason why ‘manufacturing development’ is particularly relevant in the process of 
economic catching-up. 
37
 In this respect, the UNIDO Industrial Statistics series is an exception, as it allows capturing main 
indicators for the manufacturing sector at 2- and 3-digit levels. 
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– is that a given set of machines and equipment can be used to produce a wide range of products 
of varying degrees of manufacturing complexity. In fact, the manufacture of some products 
requires technically more advanced tasks to be carried out using certain machines and 
equipment than others. Moreover, as each product is made up of different components produced 
by different firms, the output indicator (product range and complexity) has to be adjusted with 
input indicators which take indirect productive capabilities into consideration (e.g. those 
obtained by buying components produced by others and sold in the market). A set of variables 
used in Romijn’s (1999) firm-level study are synthesized in the following Table 21. 
 
Figure 9 The analytical map of production 
 
 
Source: Andreoni (2010:22). 
 
 
Table 21  A first review of variables for firm-level capability survey design 
i1.   Complexity of products 
i2.   Quality of products (indirect measures: use of measuring equipment, testing methods, etc) 
i3.   Degree of product diversification 
i4.   Level of internal design skills (indirect measures: mastery of technical drawings, no. of designers, etc.) 
i5.  Incidence of self-construction/improvement/adjustment of machines and equipments 
i6.   Complexity of the organization of production (indirect measures: no. of supervisors, functional division of tasks, 
etc.) 
i7.   Adoption of scientific production methods  
i8.   Expenses for R&D and training 
i9.   Range and complexity of engineering products (UNIDO, 1989) 
Source: Author. 
 
SKILL PROFILES BENCHMARK          TASK COMPLEXITY BENCHMARK   
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An increasing number of innovation surveys, like the one conducted by Romjin, have been 
undertaken in the last decade, although many of them lack the analytical grounding necessary 
for making the research process effective and, thus, informative. The OECD’s recent 
publication, Innovation in firms: a microeconomic perspective, together with the Oslo Manual 
(OECD, 1991) are useful tools for designing consistent and comparable innovation surveys. 
Although the subjective nature of many of the responses obtained through innovation surveys 
have been criticized, they make it possible for us to grasp important ‘process information’. For 
example, they can allow for the consideration and development of process indicators about 
firms’ objectives, barriers, informal linkages, intangibles, etc. 
 
The second approach, labelled here as the skill profiles benchmark, is based on the direct 
observation of skills requirements in each industry and thus on the idea that it is possible to 
extrapolate a stylized representation of the skills profiles that a generic firm in a specific sector 
has to be equipped with to conduct certain productive activities. Skills profiles provide a 
stylized representation (proxy) of an important subset of the productive capabilities a generic 
firm in a specific industry has to be equipped with to perform a certain set of tasks. This 
approach has been rarely followed, especially with regard to our specific goal of assessing 
sector-specific productive capabilities. Few exceptions can be found in ad hoc national, regional 
and firm-level surveys or in studies about demand for skills and skills change (Wolff, 1996 and 
2002) or skill-relatedness (Neffke and Henning, 2009). Defining specific skills profiles 
benchmarks for each industry should not let us forget that the same production process can 
actually be performed by different combinations of productive capabilities and that they have to 
be complemented by investments in the appropriate expansion of firms’ production capacity .  
 
However, this exercise can be useful for countries that aim to design selective industrial 
policies. As a matter of fact, an assessment of the productive capabilities of a given country can 
only tell us half the story. Being informed about a certain country’s capabilities endowment 
does not allow us to predict the country’s likelihood of entering a certain new productive 
activity. To do so, we need to know what productive capabilities are required in that specific 
new industry. By interfacing this information with our country-level capability assessment, we 
can evaluate which capabilities are and which are not (or not sufficiently) available in the 
country. Lacking capabilities for entering a specific industry should not, of course, lead a 
country to abandon legitimate aspirations to structural change as such capabilities may be 
deliberately created. Instead, a lack of specific capabilities has to be read as an explicit call for 
selective industrial policies. 
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The TCI – Technology Complexity Index  
Industry and Development Global Reports - UNIDO (1989/90: 123-128) and 
(1990/91:34)  
The TCI is, to our knowledge, among the first detailed indicators which takes account of sector-
specific characteristics starting from a refined combination of the two approaches detailed 
above. This methodology termed ‘technology complexity analysis’ has been conducted by a 
team of experts, mainly engineers, since 1979. This methodology was applied to the 145 most 
commonly produced capital goods in the machinery and equipment industry, ranging from 
simple metal drums to commercial airplanes. Capital goods were used because their 
manufacture requires those working skills and productive knowledge essential for 
industrialization. Each ‘capital good’ is produced by assembling a series of ‘constituent parts’. 
Based on a detailed list of ‘parts’ and ‘components’ as well as technical information about the 
assembling process, a team of engineers defined the skill score (S) for each assembling process 
and for the production of each part and component. This evaluation considered 45 distinct 
technology elements including organizing, managing and executing factory operations in 
addition to various machine operating skills. Based on this information, the TCIi results for each 
capital good i are derived from the sum of the skills score of the assembling activity Si and the 
sum of the TCI of each part and component j 
 
TCIi = Si + Σj TCIj * Pj  
 
where Pj is equal to 1 if the j part is domestically produced, and otherwise equal to 0. Next, an 
overall technological complexity index (OTCI) for each developing country was calculated by 
adding the net technology complexity index of each sub-product domestically produced38. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The need for productive capabilities indicators becomes evident when we face the problem of 
designing selective industrial policies for structural change. In order to be contextually viable, 
time-effective and structurally feasible, these policies have to be informed by appropriate 
productive capabilities indicators. Although many of today’s industrialized countries have 
implemented successful industrial policies by relying mainly on the ‘rule of thumbs’ provided 
by classical development economics (List 1844; Prebisch, 1950; Hirschman, 1958; Kaldor, 
                                                 
38
 See also Hobday (1998) and Hobday, et al. (2004) on the qualitative and quantitative assessment of 
CoPS: Complex Products and Systems.  
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1966; Chang, 1994)39, this paper suggests that in today’s global division of labour, catching-up 
economies can also benefit from adopting other heuristics and benchmarks, including 
productive capabilities indicators.  
 
Productive capabilities have been defined as personal and collective skills, productive 
knowledge and experiences embedded in physical agents and organizations needed for firms to 
perform different productive tasks as well as to adapt and conduct in-house improvements 
across different technological and organizational functions. The paper has developed an 
analytical framework for the study of productive capabilities and has highlighted the need to 
link the analysis of structural change with productive capabilities dynamics. Various synthetic 
indicators adopted by international organizations and independent researchers in cross-country 
comparisons of productive capabilities, industrial and competitive performances have been 
reviewed and compared. By subsequently identifying the methodological problems and 
informational limits of the various indicators available, the paper has developed a new set of 
industrial diagnostics to map the different drivers of structural change dynamics and to measure 
productive capabilities at the national, industry and firm levels. 
 
The methodology offered here is based on the distinction of three sets of factors which, 
respectively, enter, interact and result from processes of learning in production. For each of 
them, the paper proposes three direct measures of productive capabilities – i.e. capability 
determinants (CD), capability enablers (CE) and capability outcomes (CO) – and one indirect 
measure of country-level capability outcomes – i.e. production outputs (PO). The paper 
highlights that reliance on multiple informational spaces and the analysis of the relationships 
among input, output and mediating factors into a consistent causal structure is a fundamental 
starting point for the design of industrial policies.  
 
In fact, country-level indicators of productive capabilities can function as focusing devices and 
tools for benchmarking and ranking countries according to the process of productive capabilities 
building and accumulation experienced. In particular, productive capabilities indicators are 
extremely useful tools for assessing and comparing the productive and technological structures 
of different countries. Moreover, by relying on time-series data they can be employed as 
diagnostics for identifying the presence of industrial development precursors (that is, the 
‘starting point conditions’ in terms of productive capabilities demonstrated by a given country at 
a certain stage of development); the different trajectories of productive capabilities 
                                                 
39
 See Chang (2002) for an analysis of industrial policies in a historical perspective. 
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accumulation at the country level and, finally, their impact on productive performances and 
structural change dynamics.  
 
Finally, the paper also underscores how the design of selective industrial policies depends on 
the availability of industrial diagnostics at different levels of aggregation. Moreover, the latter 
should allow policymakers to capture the specific productive capabilities requirements of 
different industries. Therefore, the analysis of country-level indicators has been complemented 
by the elaboration of new methodologies to analyse industry-specific learning dynamics based, 
respectively, on skills profiles benchmarks and task complexity benchmarks. Further work will 
need to be conducted to test and integrate these new methodologies and to compare the results 
obtained with other similar direct and indirect indicators of productive capabilities. 
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